I don’t have time now to summarize the new phase of Bolivia’s political crisis (which included violence directed at the national police). But I think Costas overplayed his hand. He had a chance to use the results of the recall referendum as a springboard for a workable political compromise—which may still be on the table—but he opted instead to go for broke.

An anonymous comment to the previous post asks if the presidential powers are increased in the proposed constitution (CPE), relative to the existing CPE (the 2004 Constitution).

I thought it’d be interesting to look at the draft of the proposed Bolivian constitution approved a few months to see how it treats departmental autonomy.

After approving Departmental Law Nº 05, Santa Cruz plans to go forward w/ regional elections (currently scheduled for January 2009). The central government, of course, isn’t happy w/ the move. But it’s not yet clear what steps it’ll take to prevent the wholesale creation of an autonomous government structure in Santa Cruz.

Still no final numbers on Bolivia’s recall referendum, but results are already much clearer. W/ a near-final vote count, Oruro’s prefect is safe w/ just over 50% of the vote. That means that only 2 of 8 prefects up for recall lost their seats: Manfred Reyes Villa in Cochabamba & José Luis (“Pepelucho”) Paredes in La Paz. At least now Reyes Villa is also acknowledging his defeat.

The votes in Bolivia’s recall referendum are still being counted, but the results are well established by now (Evo won, as did most of the prefects). One of the losers was the La Paz prefect, José Luis Paredes. Formerly of MIR, he recently founded his own party (Plan Progreso) & was allied w/ PODEMOS. He conceded his defeat (something Cochabamba’s Manfred Reyes Villa hasn’t done).

MABB already posted the exit polls. But it looks like Evo will keep his seat (no surprise), and so will all of the pro-autonomy prefects (as will the Potosí prefect).

Bolivia’s recall referendum started today, though it’s not yet clear what counting formula will be used in the end (not the best scenario, of course). MABB has a good roundup of this.

There’s been growing attention to the issue of regional divisions in Bolivia in the last few years. Of course, these didn’t start w/ Evo’s election (they have much, much longer histories). But they’ve certainly accelerated since early 2004, when a movement demanding regional political autonomy gained momentum. Nowhere is this truer than in Santa Cruz.

We’re coming up on the final 48 hours before Sunday’s recall referendum in Bolivia. Not much is likely to happen between now & then, based on legal restrictions placed before any vote (e.g. no alcohol can be sold, motorized transportation is restricted to authorized vehicles). As of this morning, the CNE is virtually running the country (in the sense that it has temporary command authority over the country's security forces).

I mentioned earlier some recent protests unsettling Evo’s government (mostly because they’re coming from the left, not the right). The protests have both escalated, and spread.

Wednesday (August 6th) is Bolivia’s national holiday. And the national team is playing an exhibition match at RFK stadium in Washington, DC. And it looks like Jaime Moreno will be playing. Wow. I’m so glad Baltimore is only a Light Rail, a MARC, and two Metro rides away.¹ So, yes, K8 & I will be there, wearing our jerseys.

I didn’t actually attend the Boston ASA conference (K8 was giving a paper, so I was “Mr. Mom” & watched Javi). But K8 picked us up some interesting new books (all from Duke University Press).

With 10 days before the recall referendum, Evo might be heading into a tight spot. A strike by the COB (the Bolivian workers’ federation) has gained steam, and yesterday miners shut down much of the government in La Paz. The COB objects to Evo’s new pension plan, which doesn’t go as far as they would like (they insist that Evo’s government adopt the COB proposal w/o modifications).

A recent poll suggests that Evo would survive a recall referendum in Bolivia, w/ 49% in favor of keeping him in office, 18% opposed, and 33% undecided.

I’ve just uploaded the paper I’ll be presenting at the APSA meeting at the end of August: “Bolivia’s Party System after October 2003: Where Did all the Politicians Go?”

A year ago, friend & fellow Bolivian blogger Eddie Evila (of Barrio Flores) launched a project to help encourage more blogs from Bolivia—specifically in less affluent areas (his project started in El Alto).

There’s a running debate on the constitutionality of Bolivia’s recall referendums scheduled (tentatively) for August 10 over at MABB. I’ve weighed in w/ some thoughts on the legal backing of some recent related constitutional matters. But I’ve included the lengthier comment here:

You’ve gotta at least admire Quispe’s chutzpah. After allegations surfaced recently about ties between FARC, Venezuela, and Quispe’s EGTK guerrilla group, the famous Mallku (“prince”) of the Aymara katarista movement came forward w/ a press statement openly stating that he has FARC sympathies—though pointing out that he also has programmatic differences w/ the Colombian guerrillas.

Fallout from the capture of a FARC leader’s laptop in Ecuador a few months ago is starting to have some (predictable) fallout in Bolivia. Today’s La Razón has a series of articles on relationships between FARC & Bolivian groups.

It’s been an interesting past several days in Bolivia, though I’m still not sure how either of the two controversies will end. The first revolves around a series of accusations from the opposition regarding potential vote fraud in the upcoming (August 10) recall referendum. The second involves the case of Georges Nava, the army officer arrested in connection to an explosion at a Tarija television station on the eve of that department’s autonomy referendum. (Ironically, Nava was listed as working for the army’s anti-terrorism unit.)

In a new wrinkle to the upcoming recall referendum, Bolivia’s senate passed modifications to the referendum law. The new law would only require a simple majority (50%+1) for both Evo & the prefects to keep their seats; currently the number varies on the basis of the December 2005 votes (from 46.26% for Evo to 62.012% for Pepe Lucho [José Luis Paredes], the La Paz prefect).

With the upcoming recall referendum in Bolivia, there’s growing speculation about whether the embattled Evo Morales will hang on to his presidential seat. The following graph might help:

The recall referendum campaign has started in earnest in Bolivia. On August 10, Bolivian voters in 8 of 9 departments (not Chuquisaca, which only recently elected a prefect) will vote on whether their prefects should keep their posts. They’ll also vote (in all departments) on whether the president, Evo Morales, should keep his.

I was recently asked to write something about Bolivia’s foreign policy for e-IR, a new online international relations journal published by students at Oxford, University of Leicester, and the London School of Economics. The essay (“Bolivia’s New International Stage”) looks at the country’s international relations in the first two years of Evo’s government.

As expected, Savina Cuéllar won the race for Chuquisaca prefect by a comfortable margin over the MAS candidate (57.3 to 39.4 percent). Although these are unofficial “quick” counts, they’re not expected to change much. (Official results from the National Electoral Court, w/ only about half of the vote counted, so far gives Cuéllar almost 75 percent of the vote.)

Chuquisaca voters go to the polls today to elect a new prefect to replace interim prefect Ariel Iriarte. The previous prefect, David Sánchez (MAS) resigned over the government’s handling of the social unrest during the final days of the constituent assembly process in Sucre last December, which left three dead.

As expected, voters in Tarija approved an autonomy statute by wide margins. Though final counts aren’t yet in, preliminary counts show that the “Sí” vote reached about 80%. Voters in Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando have already approved autonomy statutes. It also currently looks as if voter turnout was higher than in the three other departments, despite attempts at preventing the vote by pro-MAS activists.

Back from vacation (and only now w/ cable/internet restored). Still catching up w/ news, email, work, etc. More later.

But some startling news from Tarija: An explosion at a Canal 4 installation in Yacuiba, Tarija. The department of Tarija is today wrapping up its own autonomy referendum election. At least one suspect (who has admitted to complicity) w/ ties to the presidential palace was rounded up: Lt. Georgef Peter Nava Zurita is identified as a member of the presidential guard. Another 19 civilians were arrested in connection. While Evo’s government denies any connection to Nava (though La Razón reporters who called for information pretending to be his cousin were given the opposite impression), opposition leaders are claiming this is a sign of Evo’s “state terrorism.”

Tomorrow will bring preliminary results of Tarija’s autonomy referendum. This now makes four such votes. Evo’s government has rejected all such referendums as illegal, and pro-MAS supporters have mobilized to prevent voting in each of the four regional referendum elections.

I’ve been meaning to post a note about my objections to the use of the term “race” when discussing Bolivian social politics (I prefer the term “ethnicity”). A brief report in today’s La Razón provides a great starting point: The Qhara Qhara “nation” was “reborn” yesterday.

Roberto Sándoval, campaign manager for an opposition candidate, has been freed (see news report). The ruling was made by a judge in an El Alto court, after state prosecutors were unable to present any evidence, indictments, or warrants against Sándoval. In effect, the judge ruled the arrest—made by agents of the Intelligence and Government ministries—illegal (see previous post).

The campaign manager (Roberto Sándoval) for an opposition candidate for the Chuquisaca prefecture (Sabina Cuéllar) was detained yesterday (see news report). He’s accused various crimes, including sedition & attempted “magnicide” (stemming from pro-government & opposition forces a few weeks ago in Sucre). If true, they’re serious crimes, of course. Yet the circumstances of his detention seemed questionable: A number of unidentified, masked men forced him into a vehicle. The government only acknowledged his arrest & announced its indictment 12 hours later, after his wife denounced his kidnapping.

It’s been a hectic two weeks. Since May 15, we’ve moved to Baltimore, held our son’s christening, attended two weddings (one in DC, one in Carlisle), and hosted a reunion of the Centellas brothers for Andy & Saloumeh’s MBA graduations in Delaware. We also attended two Orioles games, bought new furniture at IKEA, and have started to explore our new Mount Washington (or is it Roland Park?) neighborhood.

Bolivia’s politics shifted south this weekend. Evo suspended a planned trip to the Sucre (on the 199th anniversary of Bolivia’s “declaration of independence”¹) after university students & other local groups mobilized in opposition.

A reader tipped me off to a new public opinion poll in Los Tiempos conducted by the political science department at UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, the public university in La Paz). Unlike most polls, it includes a smaller eastern city (Montero) among its respondent sample in addition to the regular urban samples (La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz). The total sample was about 3,000 respondents.

I’m starting to put together my syllabi for next year. And so I’ve been reading some new books that I plan to use for my classes. Currently, I’m working my way through an incredibly interesting book on Nepal: Many Tongues, One People by Arjun Guneratne.

A quick clarification in light of today’s argument that Bolivia’s political opposition suggests that a recall referendum may be unconstitutional: I don’t care.

A surprising development in Bolivia: If Evo enacts a law approved by the Senate (as he said he would), there will be a recall referendum in Bolivia as early as August (90 days after the law is enacted). The recall referendum would put Evo & the country’s nine prefects up for an up or down popular vote of confidence.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF) has posted its preliminary report on the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum.

While all attention is currently on Santa Cruz, it’s important to look ahead to June 22. That’s when Tarija will hold its autonomy referendum (making it the 4th department to hold such a vote). Santa Cruz leaders will wait until then to negotiate collectively w/ the central government.

The Santa Cruz departmental electoral court (CDE) website has updated official counts, as they’re processed. They’re using the same software/process (SIRENA) as the national electoral court (CNE)—which is the software/process used by each of the regional electoral courts during national elections.

The official count will be made public by Friday. But this morning’s reports show that “Sí” (pro autonomy) won by 86% to 14% in yesterday’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum. It seems unlikely that these figures will change significantly. Some brief analysis:

The official results aren’t in yet. But El Deber (and other media) reports that the “Sí” vote won in the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum—by a wide margin (exit polling has it 85.3% to 14.7% in the city, 89.6% to 10.4% in the rural areas).

Today’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum is under way. There won’t be much news until later, of course. But the morning news highlighted problems in Yapacaní & San Julian.

Tomorrow, Santa Cruz goes to the polls in its autonomy referendum. The central government is still adamantly opposed, of course. On the eve of the election, it’s also clear that there is little that can be done to stop it. But what will happen?

Boz beat me to the latest poll numbers out of Bolivia: Evo retains 54% public approval (down from 56% in March) across Bolivia, according to the latest poll.

I’m trying to keep up w/ the escalating tension between the central government & Santa Cruz as the May 4 autonomy referendum approaches. As of the end of this week, the legal maneuvers have started to heat up: The central government has cut off the prefecture’s finances, and is preparing legal actions against the prefect & other regional leaders. In turn, the opposition (which controls the Senate, but not the House of Deputies) is initiating legal proceedings against the head of the national electoral court (the renegade regional electoral organism is moving forward with organizing the vote). All the while, the last remaining member of the Constitutional Tribunal (whose members were purged, or quit, w/ no replacements named) has initiated proceedings against the vice president for overstepping his constitutional powers. And this doesn’t begin to address the problems of social movements & counter-movements. In short, it’s a mess.

The question is, perhaps, exaggerated. Clearly, Evo—still the head of Bolivia’s cocalero federation—is an important leader w/in Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal social movements.

I’m a little late getting this news out. But. April 19 is “Día de las Voces Bolivianas” (Bolivian Voices Day).

There have been calls in the past for Evo to step down, but now they’ve become more commonplace.

We’re now a little more than three weeks away from the May 4th autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz. A broad social movement¹ calling for regional autonomy has been active in force since January 2004, coming on the heels of the October 2003 “gas war” (which pitted a very different constellation of social movements against Goni’s government).

Things in Bolivia have become increasingly tense in the last few weeks. We’re now about five weeks away from the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (set for Sunday, May 4th).

The spring speaker series I put together at Dickinson is winding down, w/ two final speakers who will focus on the Andes.

No shooting (at least not yet), but there’s a police mutiny in Bolivia.

The problems stemming from Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador a few days ago (when Colombian armed forces killed a leading FARC rebel leader) continue. Much of the problem stems from two counts:

Both Open Veins (“Colonialism at the UN”) & The Gringo Tambo (“UN international narcotics board calls on Bolivia to outlaw coca leaf”) have already commented on the recent UN report on coca. GT quotes some of the language in the UN document; Open Veins gives historical background on the matter.

There’s an excellent article in this month’s Le Monde Diplomatique on the current situation in Bolivia: “Bolivia: Morales is Checked” by Hervé Do Alto and Franck Poupeau (trans. George Miller).

In a brief 30-minute session last night, Bolivia’s legislature approved two constitutional referendums & annulled the proposed Santa Cruz & Beni autonomy referendum. The vote took place as pro-MAS protestors lay siege to the parliament building for several days, and as at least two female opposition candidates were beaten as they tried to enter the legislative session. Opposition legislators were refused the floor, the votes took place following no discussion, and the brief session took place with dozens of pro-MAS protesters crowded into the gallery.

For the past several weeks, Carlos Hugo Molina (of Ágora) has been noting internal contradictions (i.e. places were the text itself states different things in different sections) or other problems in the new Bolivian draft constitution approved last December. When I get time, I hope to put them together into an English-language summary. In the meantime, here are the links to the posts: two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

Boz, who frequently posts poll numbers from across Latin America, has some interesting poll numbers for Peru.

About five years ago, when I was doing fieldwork in Bolivia, there were only a handful Bolivian bloggers. That number has since expanded to include hundreds, and is rapidly expanding today.

First, let me be clear: the two cases are not similar in some critical & fundamental ways. But what is interesting is the political international repercussions that a secession implies.

In an interesting (though not entirely surprising) political turn, Evo has been reigned in by his own supporters (the organizaciones de base). Only days before, Evo had publicly struck out against the Santa Cruz autonomy movement (which is steamrolling forward), claiming that his supporters were willing to use force if necessary, then calling on the military & “social bases” to mobilize.

There’s been some discussion about a recent ABC News report that a Fulbright scholar in Bolivia was asked to “spy” on Venezuelans & Cubans in Bolivia (to be precise: to report if he had seen any, who, and where) during his mandatory security briefing.¹ I’ll refer to the discussion at Gringo Tambo (a group blog of primarily ex-Fulbrighters who study Bolivia).

In many ways, Santa Cruz h